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1. Introduction 
 
A large number of fundamental factors have been proposed by various researchers to 
explain a currency path or various exchange rates. Among them, Patel et al. (2014) 
have mentioned the following: inflation differentials, interest rate differentials, trade 
balance, debt, budget deficit, speculation, expectations, GDP, unit labor costs, 
productivity and political stability. In addition to those factors, they mention various 
prediction models, such as random walk, artificial neural network, feed forward 
neural network, standard backpropagation, scaled conjugate gradient, and 
backpropagation with Bayesian regularization.  
 
Most of the empirical studies have examined the first two factors, i.e. to what extent 
the absolute and relative Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and the Uncovered Interest 
Rate Parity (UIP) can explain various exchange rates (good surveys appear in Cheung 
et. al. (2005), Husted & Melvin (2013), Feenstra & Taylor, (2016)). The majority of the 
referred studies reject both theories. Notice also that some studies find opposite effects, 
i.e. instead of expected currency appreciation that the theories predict, the currency 
under investigation depreciated.  
 
Some of the explanations that have been provided why the PPP performs badly are 
the following: PPP fits better in the long-run; not all goods are traded internationally; 
productivity differentials between traded and non-traded goods exist; often there exist 
high transport costs; there are various barriers to trade or preferential agreements and 
imperfect competition; there are different adjustment speeds between capital and 
goods markets. 
 
With regard to UIP theory, various models attempt to explain its unsatisfactory or 
contradictory prediction. For instance, in monetary models of exchange rate 
determination, one relies on the assumption that the PPP holds and prices are flexible. 
Thus, the effects of expansive monetary will lead to inflation, and consequently to 
depreciation, despite the fact that the UIP theory would predict appreciation, due to 
lower interest rates from the expansive monetary policy.  
 
Similarly, in the sticky prices model of Dornbusch (1976), an expansive monetary 
policy will reduce the interest rate immediately, leading to a much larger depreciation 
(overshooting), despite the fact that the domestic prices will increase gradually, but 
later. The violation of PPP in the short run will disappear in the long run when both 
prices and interest rate will increase, leading to a strengthening of the currency.  
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In the portfolio balance model, the overshooting will improve the current account 
considerably, leading to a gradual appreciation of the currency. Moreover, the 
appreciation of the currency will subsequently eliminate the surplus. In that model 
various risk preferences for foreign or domestic bonds can be consistent with 
appreciation (depreciation) of the currency and lower (higher) domestic interest rates.  
 
In fact, some empirical studies show that the flexible-price monetary model, the sticky-
price portfolio model and the real interest differential model (or the UIP model) 
perform even worse compared to the simple random walk model. Other studies 
attempt to model exchange-rate expectations. Exchange rate forecasting is one of the 
most demanding predictions central institutions make to plan their monetary policies. 
It is therefore not surprising that this activity attracts a lot of public attention. Good 
exchange rate forecasts are not only desirable, but also important for correct policy 
formulation and future adjustments. Often, exchange rate forecasting is based on 
advanced time series models. There exist also other approaches to predict the accuracy 
of the models. For instance the forward rate in UIP assumes that expectations are 
rational, with perfect foresight and nonexistent risk premium. But expectations are not 
easily observed, vary over time and might be extrapolative and regressive as well. 
 
In this paper I will test to what extent the relative PPP, the UIP, the trade balance ratio 
and the debt-ratio can explain the SEK/$ and the SEK/€ exchange rates, over the last 
26 years, based on a 312 months period (Feb 1993 - Jan 2019)1. The PPP and the UIP 
hypotheses will be tested with standard least & non-linear least squares, as well as 
with modern methods, such as Random Forest, Nearest Neighbors, Neural Network 
and Gaussian. In addition, based on the time series processes of these exchange rates 
levels and their changes, I will run some simulations to predict the SEK path over the 
next two years. Section 2 presents a very short history of the SEK; in section 3 and 4 
the PPP and UIP are tested for SEK against $ and €; in section 5 both theories as well 
as the Fisher effect is tested; the trade balance ratio and the debt-ratio is tested in 
section 6; finally section 7 shows some predictions of both exchange rates.   
 
2. A very short history of SEK 
 
The Swedish krona (SEK) participated in the Bretton Woods system since 1950. The 
value of $ was fixed at 5.17 SEK, which was equivalent to 5.82 SEK per gram of gold. 
It kept its fixed rate until the system collapsed. In 1973 it joined the fixed exchange 
rates system "European band" or "snake". In August 1977 Sweden withdrew its SEK 
from the system, devalued the currency by 9% against the Deutschmark and pegged 
                                                 
1 All data are collected from www.ekonomifakta.se/Fakta/Ekonomi. 
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it in a new basket of currencies, where the $ had the largest weight. In September 1981 
it was devalued by 10% and in October 1982 by additional 16%. These devaluations 
were mainly due to higher inflation in Sweden.  
 
After the last devaluation it was meant that the Central Bank (Riksbank) should keep 
the currency stable. In May 1991 the currency was linked to ECU, despite the fact that 
Sweden was not a member of the EU. The central exchange rate against the ECU was 
set at 7.49 SEK. In addition to that, Sweden chose the narrow deviation (+/- 2.25%) 
from the central rate. In September 1992 the speculative attacks against many 
currencies in ECU, affected also the SEK. The country's inflation was above its 
competitors and huge capital outflows made it difficult to keep the central rate against 
the ECU. When the Riksbank failed to support the exchange rate, despite the extensive 
use of its international reserves, the last weapon in its arsenal was the interest rate and 
increased it to 500%! The attacks against SEK continued when the interest rate was 
reduced to about 40%, and two months later (November 1992) the fixed exchange rate 
regime was abandoned. The date it was announced, the SEK depreciated immediately 
by about 26%.  
 
The flexible exchange rate regime has been in force over twenty-seven years. The 
Riksbank has no mandate to stabilize the currency anymore. Its key objective has 
shifted towards keeping the rate of inflation at 2%, mainly through its key interest rate. 
As expected, the value of flexible SEK did not remain “stable”. It has been very volatile 
and overall much weaker against the main currencies. For instance, just after the 
Lehman crash, the € was valued at almost 11.50 SEK and in May 2019 about 10.8, i.e. 
the SEK depreciated by more than 40% compared to central course 7.49 SEK against 
its predecessor, ECU. Over the recent years many analysts and observers criticized the 
Riksbank for its over-aggressive monetary policy (by keeping its key interest rate 
negative over the recent years) in order to lift the rate of inflation towards its target.  
 
3. SEK & PPP theory 
 
As is known, PPP refers to the idea that the same good should be priced equally in 
both countries and is often called as the low of one price. If for instance a Volvo costs 
400,000 SEK in Sweden and 40,000 € in France, ceteris paribus, it implies that 1 € is 
worth 10 SEK. If for instance, the nominal exchange rate is 10SEK/€2, the real exchange 
rate is equal to 1, i.e. 40,000 €*10 SEK/€ = 400,000 SEK.  
                                                 
2 In this paper the nominal exchange rate is defined as domestic-currency (SEK) per foreign-currency ($, or €), i.e.  
(E = PSwe/PEU, respectively E = PSwe/PUS), indicating that higher (lower) values in E implying depreciation 
(appreciation) of the domestic currency when the domestic prices are higher (lower). Similarly, the real exchange 
rate is defined as 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/𝑃𝑃, indicating that, values below (above) 1 imply depreciation (appreciation) of the 
domestic currency. 
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If the nominal exchange rate remains at 10SEK/€ but the price of Volvo in France 
decreases to 39,000€ (=390,000SEK), the real exchange rate deviates from 1 and turns 
out to be 39,000€*10 SEK/€ / 400,000 = 0.975, indicating that Volvo is cheaper in France 
by about 2.56 percent. A Swede who plans to buy the car will buy it in France cheaper 
by 1,000€, if the nominal exchange rate remains at 10SEK/€. In fact, the car will not be 
cheaper in France because the nominal exchange rate should change to 10.2565 SEK/€, 
i.e. 39,000€*10.2565 SEK/€ = 400,000 SEK. Similarly, if the SEK depreciates by 5%, and 
the car is still priced at 400,000 in Sweden, a French citizen needs to pay 38,095 € to 
buy the car (i.e. it is like if Volvo reduces its price in France to that amount).  
 
3.1 The exchange rates 
 
The following graph shows the monthly exchange rates levels (SEK/€ & SEK/$) over 
the period Feb 1993 - Jan 2019. It is clear that both series3, and especially the SEK/$, 
are volatile. 
 
 
Normality and Stationarity tests 
 
None of the series is normally distributed. The normality hypothesis for both exchange 
rates is rejected at the 5% level, based on the Cramér-von Mises test. In fact, the three 
best distributions estimated in Mathematica are various combinations of normal and 
log-normal, as well as extreme value distributions. For instance the extreme value 
distribution of SEK/€, has a mean value4 of 9.23, while the extreme value distribution 
of SEK/$ has a mean value of 7.78.  (In Appendix A, you can see the oscillating mean, 
                                                 
3 The Euro was introduced in January 1, 1999. Prior to 1999 the SEK/€ refers to its predecessor, ECU, i.e. it is 
based on the theoretical weights of the EU countries’ currencies. 
4 The mean value of the extreme value distribution is given by:𝛼𝛼 + EulerGamma 𝛽𝛽, where α is a location 
parameter and β is a scale parameter (see Mathematica).  
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
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the noisy volatility and the unstable skewness, kurtosis and other measures as well, of 
both exchange rates levels, their histograms, and the three best Kernel estimated 
distributions).   
 
Not only are the series non-normal, they are also non-stationary. The stationarity tests 
below do not reject the existence of unit roots at 5% (or even lower) levels.  
 
Test5 SEK/€ SEK/$ 
Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value 
Dickey-Fuller F 0.0915916 0.70765 0.0188754 0.687222 
Dickey-Fuller T 0.297102 0.771145 0.0343379 0.692943 
Phillips-Perron F 0.0925012 0.707901 0.00932872 0.684483 
Phillips-Perron T 0.302985 0.77275 0.016418 0.68715 
 
Due to non-stationarity in exchange rates, the regressions can spuriously show a 
significant effect of the explanatory variables that might not be true, i.e. yielding 
incorrect t-statistics in estimates.  
 
A simple method to make the series stationary is to take the differences in logarithms, 
such as month to month in the same year, quarter to quarter in the same year, or month 
to month for subsequent years. The three respective processes estimated by 
Mathematica for the SEK/$ are: GARCH (1,1), ARMA (1,2) and ARMA (1,1). Similarly, 
the three respective processes for SEK/€ are: GARCH (1,1), ARMA (2,2) and AR (1).  
 
Also the average of annual differences in logarithms are weakly stationary, as shown 
in the following graph. Notice that the SEK/€ is two years shorter6 (1996 - 2018). 
Positive values show annual rates of depreciation of SEK. It is clear that SEK started to 
depreciate about seven years ago and its weakening continues until now (May 2019). 
 
                                                 
5 The Dickey-Fuller F, respectively Phillips-Perron F tests, test jointly for both a unit root and a zero 
intercept; see for instance, Elder & Kennedy (2001). 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.22.7168&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
6 Prior to 1996, there were some countries that did not meet the Maastricht criteria. For instance, not all 
countries were meeting the inflation limits and the average inflation in EU was very volatile. Since the 
PPP theory relates inflation differences to exchange rates differences, the SEK/€ starts two years later 
than the SEK/$. 
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Moreover, despite the fact that the changes of SEK/$ and SEK/€ are stationary, they 
are not normally distributed (see Appendix B). The non-normality is confirmed at the 
histogram comparison to fitted smooth kernel normal distribution. The SEK/$ for 
instance has two peaks, and fatter tails point out at non-normal patterns. In Appendix 
B, you can also see their means and standard deviations. 
 
3.2 The inflation differentials 
 
The inflation differentials between Sweden & US, respectively Sweden & EU, over the 
same period are shown below. Both inflation differentials series are weakly stationary, 
the SWE - EU is MA (1) while the SWE - US is AR (1). The average inflation differential 
over the investigated period was slightly lower in Sweden, by about -0.6 %, compared 
to the US and EU.  
 
 
Since both explained (exchange rate changes) and explanatory variables (inflation 
changes) are stationary, the OLS estimates will be unbiased.  
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The relative PPP regression to be tested is given by: 
 
ΔLog [𝐸𝐸] = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2(ΔLog [𝑃𝑃] − ΔLog [𝑃𝑃∗]) + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 , 
 where: 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐸𝐸] = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎 𝛥𝛥𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 $⁄ , respectively 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 €⁄ , 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝑃𝑃] − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝑃𝑃∗] = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆, 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝐸𝐸𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆  and  𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 ∼  𝑁𝑁(0, σ2) 
 
If PPP holds, α1 = 0 & α2 = 1, i.e. higher inflation in Sweden will increase the exchange 
rate (i.e. the SEK will depreciate against the respective currency)7. 
 
Both Linear (LS) and Non-linear least squares (NLS) were applied. Since LS minimize 
the sum of squares of correlated errors, the NLS that minimize the sum of non-
correlated errors is to be preferred (Hill et. al., 2008). Moreover, both methods yield 
almost identical estimates.   
 
The NLS estimates are given below. It is clear that the relative PPP hypothesis α2 = 1 is 
rejected for both exchange rates. In fact, for SEK/$, α2 = -1, i.e. the SEK has depreciated 
against the $ because of lower inflation in Sweden! According to these estimates it 
would appreciate by about 7% if the Swedish inflation were 1% higher than the US! 
Similarly, the Swedish inflation needs to be 1% lower than the EU for the SEK/€ to 
remain stable.  
 
ΔLog [𝐸𝐸] 𝑎𝑎1 𝑎𝑎2 R2 DW 
SEK/$ −0.0342 
(1.65) 
-0.0414* 
(2.83) 
0.26 1.40 
SEK/€ 0.0133 
(0.99) 
0.0136 
(0.95) 
0.04 1.95 
t-stat in parenthesis; (**, *)  denote 0.01, respectively 0.05 
significance level 
 
The R2-values are low, while the Durbin-Watson values indicate no clear 
autocorrelation for the SEK/$ and absence of autocorrelation for the SEK/€. The 
regression equations and their residuals are shown on the following graphs. The 
residuals satisfy the assumption 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 ∼  𝑁𝑁(0, σ2), because the null hypothesis that they are 
normally distributed is not rejected at the 5 percent level based on the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. All pair of points, identified by the respective year, are shown as a 
buddle charts in Appendix C.  
                                                 
7 The hypothesis α2 = 1 is an ideal relationship of the relative PPP and is rather impossible to achieve it at 
least in the short run. Thus, it is sufficient to show that α2 > 0, if the pairs of exchange rate and inflation 
differences do not necessarily lie on a 450 line. 
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From the SEK/€ graphs one can observe that, despite the fact that the Swedish inflation 
was lower than the EU inflation over 15 out of 23 years, the SEK is not stronger. For 
instance, the recent negative inflation difference is identical to 2011. Moreover, the 
recent SEK depreciation (May 2019) is about 7% while in 2011 the SEK appreciated by 
about 11%.  
 
In addition to NLS, I applied four modern methods from Mathematica; Gaussian 
Process, Nearest Neighbors, Random Forest and Neural Network. All graphs are 
found in Appendix D. None of them support the relative PPP. On the contrary, the last 
three seem to reveal that a lower Swedish inflation leads to a depreciated SEK against 
the $, precisely as the NLS above. Thus, the SEK is undervalued against the $ according 
to the relative PPP. Similarly, these methods show that SEK is undervalued against the 
€ too. 
 
 
4. SEK & IRP theory 
 
While the PPP is a long run equilibrium exchange rate, the Interest Rate Parity (IRP) is 
based on asset market models and attempts to analyze movements in exchange rates 
over the short run. According to IRP, the exchange rate between two countries will 
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reflect the differences in the respective interest rates. There are two variants of IRP, the 
Uncovered and the Covered. 
 
Assume a US investor who buys SEK (with USA = domestic country and Sweden = 
foreign country). Assume that the spot exchange rate is S = 0.1$/SEK in New York (or 
10SEK/$ in Stockholm). Assume also that the annual interest rates are rSW = 0.01, 
respectively rUS = 0.025. If there are no other risk-premia or preferences towards $ or 
SEK, one can estimate the arbitrage free future spot of SEK (forward) in terms of $ (or 
$ forward in terms of SEK).  
 
The estimation is based on the following strategy (in $): 
a) Borrow SEK 1 M and pay back next year SEK 1.01 M 
b) Exchange SEK 1 M to 0.1$ and save it in the US 
and simultaneously, 
c) Sell the $ forward at (F) and buy SEK to pay back your loan in SEK. 
 
The US investor will receive in a year (in US): 0.1*(1.025) = $ 0.1025 M. Without 
arbitrage profit, 102,500 $ = 1,010,000 SEK, i.e. approximately F = 0.1015$/SEK, or 
9.5375SEK/$. This implies that the $ in Sweden is expected to fall from 10SEK/$ to 
9.5375SEK/$, or the SEK in the US to increase from 0.1$/SEK to 0.1015$/SEK. Thus, 
at equilibrium the following relationship must hold, in the domestic country, USA: 
𝐹𝐹 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)(1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆) 𝑆𝑆, 
 
That is the well-known Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP).  
 
Therefore, if 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 < 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, the SEK will be stronger in the future (F > S). If on the other 
hand, F < S, (i.e. the SEK is expected to weaken in the future), a stronger SEK now will 
be consistent only if 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 > 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈. This equilibrium condition applies to changes in 
interest rates as well. For instance, if the US increase its interest rate to 0.03 (or if 
Sweden decreases its own rate to 0.005), the spot exchange rate will change as well (i.e. 
the SEK will depreciate, perhaps from 10 SEK/$ to 10.25 SEK/$) and consequently the 
forward rate will change too.  
 
Moreover, the UIP cannot be tested, since the market expectations of the future 
exchange rate are not observed. Some investors expect the forward rate to be at 
premium, while others to be at discount, and many might disregard c) in the above 
strategy. In that case the expected exchange rate in the future will be different from F 
= 0.1015$/SEK, and the interest rate parity will then be Uncovered (UIP), or risky. For 
instance the US investor who invests in the US will experience losses, if the SEK gets 
stronger than 0.1015$/SEK. If the exchange rate in New York is higher than 0.11$/SEK, 
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its savings in the US are lower than needed to pay back its loan in Sweden (it will have 
only 102,500$ that will be worth 931,818SEK, i.e. a loss of 78,182SEK compared to 
1,010,000SEK the investor must pay for the loan). Similarly, the US investor will make 
profits if the $ gets stronger than 0.10$/SEK.  
 
Instead of using forward exchange rates, we can assume that 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐹𝐹] = Log[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1] 
and Log[S] = Log[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡]. Thus, the UIP can be formulated as: 
 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1] − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟∗𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 , where:  
 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1] − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] = % 𝛥𝛥𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 $⁄ , 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 €⁄ 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟, (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟∗𝑡𝑡)= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆, 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝐸𝐸𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝛥𝛥𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖 and  𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 ∼  𝑁𝑁(0, σ2) 
 
Notice that, if 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1] − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] > 0, the SEK will depreciate, while if it is negative, 
it will appreciate. 
 
The UIP holds if the right part side has the same sign as the left part side. For instance, 
if 𝛽𝛽1 = 0 & 𝛽𝛽2= 1, the SEK is going to depreciate (appreciate) by the same percentage8, 
if the Swedish interest rates are higher (lower). Similarly, if 𝛽𝛽2= -1, the SEK is also going 
to depreciate if (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟∗𝑡𝑡) < 0 and appreciate if (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟∗𝑡𝑡) > 0.   
 
Many empirical studies that test if UIP holds (such as Fama (1984), Froot & Thaler 
(1990), Sarno (2005), Chinn (2007), Spronk et al (2013), Miller (2014)) reject that the 
forward rate will be the true spot rate in the future. Some of them (Froot & Thaler 
(1990)) find a significant opposite effect (-0.88), i.e. the currency of the country that has 
the highest interest rates appreciates, this leads to a third option.  
 
According to that option, the so-called carry trade strategy, investors make risky 
(naïve) decisions based only on the interest rate differences, and speculate against SEK 
that nowadays pays lower interest rates. They simply short the SEK and they do not 
expect it to appreciate, as the UIP would predict. When sufficiently many traders and 
investors share the same view in the market, the SEK will depreciate, irrespectively if 
the theory would predict an appreciation of the SEK.  
 
The carry trade strategy will hold if 𝛽𝛽1 = 0 & 𝛽𝛽2= -1, i.e. the SEK is going to depreciate 
(appreciate), if the Swedish interest rates are lower (higher). 
                                                 
8 Again, there is no need to be “by the same percentage”. Moreover, if exchange rates react directly to interest 
rates differences, it is often argued that the pairs of exchange rate and interest rates differences should lie 
on a 450 line. 
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Some studies (Frankel & Froot (1990), Galati & Melvin (2004), Burnside et al (2006)) 
find that this simple (but risky) carry trade strategy is rather profitable.  
 
The graph below shows the key interest rates (Riksbank, FED and ECB) in the three 
countries, over the period 1999 - 2018. All rates were almost identical around 2014, but 
thereafter the interest rate in Sweden turned negative, while the US increased and the 
Euro interest rate remained almost unchanged. 
 
 
 
 
4.1 The estimates 
 
As was mentioned previously, the month-to-month for subsequent years for the 
SEK/$ is an ARMA (1,1) process while the SEK/€ is an AR (1) process.  Also, the EU-
SWE interest rate differential is an ARMA (1,1) process, and the US-SWE interest rate 
differentials is a MA (1) process. Since all processes are stationary9, the NLS estimates 
are unbiased.  
 
The NLS estimates for both exchange rates are given below. It is clear that the UIP 
theory is rejected for both exchange rates (t-stat in parenthesis). R2-values are low, 
there is no autocorrelation and the non-normality of residuals is not rejected.   
 Log[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1] − Log[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] 𝛽𝛽1 𝛽𝛽2 R2 DW 
SEK/$ 0.00082 
(0.04) 
-0.0119 
(1.76) 
0.15 1.48 
SEK/€ 0.00654 
(0.6) 
-0.0245 
(1.1) 
0.06 2.06 
                                                 
9 Notice that the annual interest rates in Sweden is an ARIMA (0, 1, 0) process but non-stationary. On the other 
hand both the EU and US interest rates are ARMA (1,1) and stationary.  
2000 2005 2010 2015
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Interest rates
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US
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Only a very weak negative effect (at about 9% level of significance) is found for the 
SEK/$, indicating a weak support for the carry trade strategy. For instance if the 
interest rate differential between Sweden and US is -2.5 (as it is now, May 2019), the 
product 𝛽𝛽2(𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟∗𝑡𝑡) = +5.25%, implying a SEK depreciation of about 5.25% 
(annually). Thus, those who borrowed SEK 1 M and invested their exchanged SEK into 
$ in the US at 2%, would make high profits when they pay back their SEK-loans, with 
their appreciated $. Similarly, given the recent interest rate differential between 
Sweden and EU (-0.5) the product −0.0245(−0.5) predicts less than 2% SEK 
depreciation, which is much lower than the recent depreciations. 
 
 
  
As you can see on the first graph above (SEK/$), out of twenty interest rates 
differentials (horizontally) and exchange rate changes (vertically), twelve are 
negatively correlated, and eight are positively correlated, showing a very weak 
support of the UIP. Notice though that there have been five observations (upper, right) 
where the SEK depreciated, despite the fact that the interest rates differences were 
positive. Similarly there have been three observations (lower, left) where the SEK 
appreciated, even when the interest rates differences were negative.  
 
The additional four methods applied do not seem to clearly support the UIP (see 
Appendix F). The Random Forest and the Nearest Neighbors show a very weak 
negative effect, while the Gaussian and Neural Network show unclear effects. In fact, 
2 1 0 1 2
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0.10
0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
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the non-linearity is apparent in the Neural Network, where interest rates differences 
of about -1.5 percentage units, or positive, seem to strengthen the SEK against $. Larger 
percentage units than -1.5 and differences between -1.5 & 0 seem to weaken it.  
 
Finally, in addition to annual interest rates differences, I repeated the regressions with 
both 240 monthly and 60 quarterly (Feb 1999 - Jan 2019) observations.  Neither the 
intercept, nor the slope were different from zero (see Appendix E). 
 
Thus, the standard argument by many analysts, namely that the Swedish Riksbank is 
responsible for the weak SEK, by keeping its key interest rate negative (or widening 
the negative interest rate differential between Sweden and US, respectively EU), does 
not hold. That argument seems to be valid over the recent three to four years, while 
similar negative interest rates differences a few years earlier, did not weaken the SEK 
that time.  The support for the alternative carry trade strategy is very weak (for the 
SEK/$) and is rejected for the SEK/€. Remember though that this strategy is naïve and 
might have worked over the recent years. Moreover, a sudden strengthening of SEK 
will force the investors (speculators) to abandon that risky strategy and start covering 
their positions as implied by the CIP. 
 
 
5. PPP & IRP combined 
 
So far, I have used nominal interest rates. Investors might be interested in the real 
interest rate differentials that can affect the exchange rate, either through the IRP, or 
the curry trade mentioned above. Consequently, if PPP and IRP hold, the real interest 
rates should be equal across countries.   
 
A variant of real interest rates is credited to Irving Fisher, so that a rise in the expected 
inflation rate in one country will lead to a rise in its nominal interest rate, i.e. (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟∗𝑡𝑡) = (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃∗𝑡𝑡). Is that true between Sweden and US respectively €? 
 
To test the Fisher effect, the following simple regression was used:   (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟∗𝑡𝑡) =  γ1 + γ2(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃∗𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
 
For instance, if  γ1 = 0 & γ2 > 0, or optimally γ2 = 1, the Fisher effect exists.  
 
Simple regressions show that the Fisher effect is not rejected between Sweden and US. 
The slope  γ2 = 0.87 and is significant from zero at the 5% level, with an R2 = 0.27. On 
the other hand there is no Fisher effect between Sweden and EU (the slope is negative 
but not significant from zero and R2 almost zero). 
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An alternative method is to test if the real exchange rates, 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸 𝑃𝑃∗𝑃𝑃 , differ. Instead of 
testing that , I tested if PPP (inflation differences) and IRP (interest rates differences) 
simultaneously can explain the changes in SEK/$, respectively SEK/€. The estimates 
are:  
 
𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆$ = −0.0308 − 0.0333𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 − 0.0111𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅,  
𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆€ =  0.0050  − 0.00275𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 − 0.02483𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅,  
where, ΔI = inflation differences & ΔR = interest rates differences. 
 
Both are very poor and all parameters are insignificant. The three-dimensional graphs 
below show almost horizontal planes (i.e. no changes in exchange rates are explained 
by PPP and IRP). About half of the observations are visible while the remaining are 
below the surface and are invisible. 
 
 
 
6. Other factors 
 
Neither the inflation differentials, nor the interest rate differentials hypotheses seem 
to explain why the SEK is so weak against the $ and €.  The PPP is clearly rejected (in 
fact the reverse effect was not rejected against the $). Even the IRP is rejected against 
the € and almost rejected against the $.  
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Can other factors, such as trade balance and current account, or budget deficit and 
debt-ratio explain the weakening of SEK? 
 
6.1 The trade balance 
 
There is a huge empirical literature that investigates if the exchange rate depreciation 
improves the trade balance, generally over time, i.e. if the J-curve exists. Wang (1993), 
Marwah and Klein (1996), Shirvani and Wilbratte (1997), Gupta-Kapoor and 
Ramakrishnan (1999), Bahmani-Oskooee and Goswami (2003), Arora et. al. (2003), 
Ghosh et al. (2008), show that the real exchange rate depreciation improves trade and 
confirmed the J-curve. According to Suranjali Tandon (2014), a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate improves trade balance for some countries, like Italy and France in 
Europe, as well as for Brazil, Mexico and the Philippines. On the other hand, the trade 
balance in other European countries, China and Malaysia is not affected, while for the 
UK, Japan and Singapore an appreciation of the real exchange rate improves their 
trade balance. Other studies, Rose and Yellen (1989), Rose (1991), Rodrik (1994) and 
Elbadawi (1998) found no relationship between trade and exchange rate; Bahmani-
Oskooee and Brooks (1999), Wilson (2001), Baharumshah (2001), found no evidence 
for the J-curve. Finally, other studies, Cushman (1983), Thursby and Thursby (1987), 
Arslan and van Wijnbergen (1993), Chowdhury (1993), Arize et al. (2000) and 
Mohamad and Nair (2009) found that exchange rate volatility depresses the volume of 
exports.  
 
Normally, a country with trade surplus like Sweden10, will accumulate foreign 
currency. When the holdings of foreign money, relative to domestic money, increase, 
the foreign currency will depreciate (or the domestic currency appreciate). Sweden has 
experienced surpluses in both trade balance and current account since early 90ies. For 
instance the trade surplus has never been below 2% of its GDP and during 1995-2007 
it was around 7-8%. Similarly, the current account has never been lower than 2% of its 
GDP, and over a 12-year period (1999-2011), was above than 5%. The last figures for 
the current account are from 2017, placing Sweden above China (with +3.2% of its 
GDP, versus 1.3% for China) and the US with -2.4%.  
 
Since we are interested in explaining the exchange rate in Sweden, contrary to all 
studies mentioned above that used the exchange rate as a determinant of trade balance, 
in this study the trade balance ratio to GDP (TB) will be treated as a determinant of 
exchange rate.  Below there are some regression estimates between TB and exchange 
rates (E), both in levels (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡) and in changes (𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1] − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] =
                                                 
10 Since 1982, Sweden has always achieved a trade balance surplus. Against the US and most European countries, 
Sweden had surplus in 2018. The largest deficit was against Germany (-108 billion SEK), the Netherlands (-54 
billion SEK) and the Czech Republic (-10 billion SEK).   
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𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇] + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡), annually. It is expected that 𝛽𝛽2< 0, i.e. if the trade balance 
improves, the exchange rate will decrease (i.e. the SEK is going to appreciate). 
 
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽1 𝛽𝛽2 R2 n 
Level SEK/$ 7.43** 
(13.2) 
0.0605 
(0.64) 
0.016 26 
Change SEK/$ 0.0026 
(0.14) 
-0.055 
(0.42) 
0.008 25 
Level SEK/€ 9.79** 
(36.4) 
-0.1023* 
(2.31) 
0.19 24 
Change SEK/€ 0.0022 
(.18) 
-0.053 
(.53) 
0.013 23 
t-stat in parenthesis; (**, *)  denote 0.01, respectively 0.05 significance level 
 
The estimates for SEK/$ are very poor, because the trade balance ratio has no effect on 
the exchange rate (nether for the level nor for its changes). On the other hand, for the 
SEK/€ level, 𝛽𝛽2= -0.1023 (significant at 0.05), i.e. the SEK would appreciate. For 
instance, with an actual trade balance ratio of 3%, and given the strongly significant 
intercept of 9.79, the exchange rate should be about 9.50SEK/€, i.e. at least 1 SEK lower 
compared to May 2019.  For the SEK/€ changes though, the estimates are also poor. 
 
6.2 The debt ratio 
 
The empirical literature between public debt and exchange rates is rather consistent. 
McMillin and Koray (1990) found that shocks in the US debt lead to a short-lived 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar;  Devereux and Lane (2001) found that exchange rate 
depreciation increases foreign borrowing through nominal and real interest rate; Fida 
et. al. (2012) found that increase in external debt depreciates the real exchange rate in 
Pakistan; also Alam and Taib (2013) found that external debt is related to the exchange 
rate depreciation, and more significant in debt trap countries (India, Indonesia, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Thailand) than in non-debt trap countries (Bangladesh, Fiji, 
Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines and Singapore). More 
recently, Bunescu (2014) for Romania and Palić et. al. (2018) for Croatia found that the 
depreciation of the domestic currencies leads to an increase in external indebtedness. 
An alternative link between currency risk premia, external debt in $ and depreciation 
is provided by Wiriadinata (2018). According to her, when the $ strengthens, the real 
value of dollar debt increases and consequently weakening the currencies of countries 
with large amounts of dollar debt. 
 
Sweden’s debt ratio is among the lowest in the EU. Last figures for 2018 show a debt 
ratio of about 26% compared to about 74% from its top in 1995, i.e. a steady decline of 
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at least 4% per year. Sweden has also experienced a budget surplus over the recent 
years. In 2018 the surplus was (preliminary) around 90 billion SEK, (about 1.5% of its 
GDP). The large deficit (131 billion SEK) observed in 2013 was motivated by the fact 
that the Swedish National Debt Office borrowed around 100 billion SEK to strengthen 
the international reserves of Riksbank that had weakened after the Lehman crash.  
 
Below we present some regression estimates, between debt-ratio (D) and exchange 
rates (E), both in levels (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐷𝐷) + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡) and changes (𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1] − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] =
𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥[𝐷𝐷] + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡), annually, (t-values in parentheses). It is expected that 𝛽𝛽2 > 0, i.e. 
if the debt-ratio increases, the exchange rate will increase (i.e. the SEK is going to 
depreciate).  
 
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽1 𝛽𝛽2 R2 n 
Level SEK/$ 7.65** 
(12.2) 
0.0026 
(0.2) 
0.002 26 
Change SEK/$ −0.0009 
(0.04) 
-0.1377 
(0.5) 
0.01 25 
Level SEK/€ 10.04** 
(34.6) 
-0.0189** 
(3.03) 
0.29 24 
Change SEK/€ 0.0083 
(.63) 
0.0676 
(.40) 
0.008 23 
t-stat in parenthesis; (**, *)  denote 0.01, respectively 0.05 significance level 
 
The estimates are very poor, because the debt-ratio does not seem to explain the SEK. 
Notice though that for the SEK/€ level, 𝛽𝛽2< 0 (significant at 0.01). This means that the 
actual debt ratio of 26% reduces the value of € by almost 0.5 SEK and the theoretically 
correct value of Euro should be 10.04 – 0.5 = 9.55SEK/€, i.e. again about 1 SEK cheaper 
than the existing one (May 2019). Alternatively, other things being equal, and the debt 
ratio remained at 41% (as it was in 2006), the € would cost around 9.15 SEK. 
 
7. Forecasting of exchange rates 
 
The falsification of PPP and UIP to explain and predict the exchange rates, led to model 
it as random-walk processes. Such random-walks forecasts are improved marginally, 
but not systematically, if they include other macroeconomic and financial 
fundamentals forecasts (see for instance Rossi (2013), for a broad review). For instance, 
Cheung et al. (2005) showed that the mean‐squared errors from PPP models are lower 
than those of a random walk for longer horizons, while UIP models do not significantly 
improve on the random walk at any horizon. Carriero et al. (2009) and Dal Bianco et al. 
(2012) have improved on the point forecasts of a random walk by relying respectively 
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on a Bayesian VAR with a large set of exchange rates, and on a mixed frequency 
dynamic factor model with 4‐weekly exchange rates and lower frequency 
macroeconomic fundamentals. According to Engel and West (2005), the exchange rate 
unpredictability is due to the typical structural models used. They suggest that all 
exchange rate determination models should be re-formulated as present discounted 
values of current and future fundamentals, as well as unobservable shocks. Such a 
modelling will have a very weak correlation between the exchange rates and the 
current fundamentals when fundamentals are persistent and agents are patient. On 
the other hand, future fundamentals will matter more than current fundamentals. 
Rossi (2006) on the other hand argues that the instability of the relationship between 
exchange rates and their fundamentals is due to various trading strategies that often 
put different weights to fundamentals. Bacchetta and Wincoop (2009) support that and 
show that structural parameters are unknown to economic agents. 
 
Yongmiao et al. (2007) and Balke et al. (2013) focused on density forecasts and showed 
that the density forecasts of a random walk can be improved either with non‐linear 
models, or with univariate Taylor rule models with semiparametric confidence 
intervals. Della Corte et al. (2009), found that the time varying volatility is important 
for the 1‐month‐ahead predictive ability of macroeconomic fundamentals. Mumtaz 
and Sunder‐Plassmann (2013) showed that a structural time varying stochastic 
volatitity VAR, is superior compared to the constant volatility. Finally, Molodtsova 
and Papell (2009) and Inoue and Rossi (2012), support the Taylor rules11, while Rogoff 
and Stavrakeva (2008) question its validity.  
 
In this section I will forecast both exchange rates, as levels and as changes, over the 
next two years, based only on time series modelling, i.e. excluding the macroeconomic 
and financial factors. Although the pure time series modelling is agnostic and neglects 
the requirements for richer explanatory variables, this simplicity and dependence only 
on its past values makes it flexible, powerful and dynamic in nature and adapts well 
to the exchange rate process.  
 
(i) Exchange rates levels  
 
The best fit for monthly SEK/$ (Feb 1993- Jan 2019) is an ARIMA (0, 1, 0) process. 
However, the process is not stationary and its value increases by 0.004 per month. The 
graph below shows that SEK is going to depreciate slightly against $ (to about 9.12 
SEK compared to 9.02 SEK in Feb. 2019).  
 
                                                 
11 The Taylor rule is not valid for Sweden because the key interest rate is set solely as a function of inflation 
fluctuations. 
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Similarly, the best fit for SEK/€ is an ARMA (1,1) process, which is weakly stationary. 
 
 
 
 
 
Contrary to the SEK/$, the SEK/€ stationary ARMA (1,1) process shows that SEK is 
going to appreciate against €. By the end of 2019 the € is expected to cost around 10 
SEK and by the end of 2020 is going to cost around 9.73 SEK, compared to 10.37 in 
Feb. 2019. 
 
(ii) Exchange rates changes  
 
If we turn to exchange rates changes, (differences in logarithms, month-to-month over 
subsequent years), both series are stationary. The best fit for SEK/$ is an ARMA (1,1) 
process, while the best fit for SEK/€ is an AR (1) process. Below I forecast the upper 
and lower bounds, by computing the standard errors and reviewing the entire model 
with the error bands (see Appendix G for the Mathematica code). 
 
past SEK $
forecast
past SEK
forecast
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We can see where the predicted exchange rate value can go during the next two years. 
The SEK/$ bounds are larger than the respective SEK/€ bounds. Again, some 
appreciation of the SEK is expected against both currencies. For instance, the upper 
bounds at the end of the forecasting period are almost equal to the last exchange rates 
(Feb 2019), while the lower bounds indicate clear appreciations against both 
currencies. By the end of 2020, the SEK will be slightly depreciated against the $ (by 
almost 2%, compared to 14% in Feb 2019). Similarly, the SEK will be slightly 
depreciated against the € (by almost 1%, compared to 6% in Feb 2019). 
 
Finally, we can examine the stochastic nature of the model. I have simulated 50 future 
exchange rate paths over the next 24 months, determined two distributional quantiles 
(5% & 95%) and visualized them on the following graphs. As this is often true in all 
future predictions, we can detect where seasonality effect can influence exchange rate 
forecast. This can be seen as additional 'risk factor' in the outcome prediction. From 
the above analysis we can easily locate the quantile values as ‘extreme outcomes’ within 
some prediction tolerance (see Appendix G for the Mathematica code). 
 
past SEK $
forecast
upperr band
low err band
past SEK
forecast
upperr band
low err band
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The projected exchange rates (middle, blue line) shows a strengthening of the SEK 
against both $ and €. Moreover, given the fact that during the first four months in 2019 
the SEK was depreciated against both $ and € by about 4-5% (i.e. seems to lie above 
the blue line), the SEK might not appreciate as gradual and smooth as the projected 
blue line shows. Perhaps its appreciation is going to follow some rather sharp and 
volatile paths.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Neither of the four fundamental theories tested (PPP, UIP, trade balance ratio and debt 
ratio) explain the “weak” SEK. The lower inflation rate in Sweden over the recent years 
was not sufficient to strengthen the currency. Similarly, the theoretically stronger SEK 
implied by the lower interest rates in Sweden as the UIP predicts, has not emerged yet. 
Its weakness only against the $ supports, very weak though, the carry trade 
hypothesis. Finally, neither the persistent trade balance surpluses, nor the declining 
Projection
Upper band
Lower band
Projection
Upper band
Lower band
22 
 
and very low debt ratio have had any positive effects on the currency.  Perhaps, two 
other factors, GDP or GDP/capita differentials, can explain the weakening of the SEK.   
 
If most of the economic fundamentals are in favor and the currency is not 
“appreciated” by the market, it seems that the traders and investors speculate against 
the SEK and keep it undervalued. Moreover, a number of simulated paths, predicted 
from various ARIMA-processes, based on the historic exchange rates, show that the 
worse exchange rates have already gone and by the end of 2020 the $ and the € will 
cost around 8 and 9.8 SEK respectively.    
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Histograms (Levels) 
 
  
 
Best Kernel Distributions (Levels) 
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Appendix D 
 
SEK/$ and Relative PPP (Additional methods) 
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Appendix E 
 
SEK/$ and IRP estimates with monthly and quarterly data 
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Appendix F 
 
SEK/$ and IRP (Additional methods) 
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Appendix G 
 
Mathematica code for forecasting SEK/$ changes over 24 months 
 
tsdata$=TimeSeries[SEK/$]; (*Make a Time Series of the monthly SEK/$ exchange rates; 
312 obs.*) 
dlogSEK$=Log[tsdata$]; (*Take their logarithms*) 
dlogdata$=Differences[dlogSEK$,1,12]; (*Take their month to month differences in 
subsequent years; 300 obs.*) 
 
tmf$ = TimeSeriesModelFit[dlogdata$]; (*Fit a Time Series Model; it is an ARMA (1, 1) 
process; 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝛥𝛥𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎[0.000378, {0.913206}, {0.107103}, 0.001956]*) 
 
forecast =TimeSeriesForecast[tmf$["Process"], dlogdata$,{0,2*12}]; (*Using the ARMA 
(1,1) process, make 24 temporal data with mean zero*) 
 
TimeSeriesModelFit[forecast]; (*Fit a Time Series Model; it is an ARIMA (0, 2, 0) 
process; 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝛥𝛥𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎[0.000165, {},2, {},0.000001]*) 
 
moderr= ; 
uperr=TimeSeriesThread[{1,1}.#&,{forecast, moderr}]; 
dnerr=TimeSeriesThread[{1,-1}.#&,{forecast, moderr}]; (*Model the forecasting errors, 
as well as the upper and down errors*) 
  
DateListPlot[{TimeSeriesWindow[dlogdata$,{{2009,1,1}, {2019,1,1}}], forecast, uperr, 
dnerr}, Joined->True, PlotTheme->"Business", Filling->{3->{4}}, PlotLegends->{"past 
SEK/$", "forecast", "upp err band", "low err band"}, PlotLabel->Style["% SEK/$ 
forecst with prediction errors",15]] (*Use a Times Series Window and Plot that, together 
with the forecasted SEK/$ changes and their upper and lower errors*)  
 
 
Mathematica code for simulating 50 SEK/$ changes, over 24 months 
 
sim=RandomFunction[tmf$, {0, 24}, 50]; 
stmean=TimeSeriesThread[Mean, sim]; 
stup=TimeSeriesThread[Quantile[#,0.95]&, sim]; 
stdown=TimeSeriesThread[Quantile[#,0.05]&, sim]; 
sim2=DateListPlot[sim, PlotStyle->Directive[Opacity[.30]], Joined->True,  
PlotRange->All]; 
Show[DateListPlot[{stmean, stup, stdown}, PlotStyle->{Blue,Red, Darker[Green]}, 
PlotLabel->Style["Projected SEK/$ with confidence bands",15],  
PlotLegends->{"Projection", "Upper band", "Lower band"}], sim2] 
forecast "MeanSquaredErrors"
